Foreword:
Jonas is a friend of Gua Ge. We have known each other for a while. They are both practitioners who have transitioned from the financial industry to WEB3. Together, we have had many in-depth discussions on all aspects of chain games. This time Jonas published an article about the leasing model of Gamefi NFT, and he looks forward to discussing it with everyone. Jonas’s Twitter: @jojonas_xyz, friends can follow and communicate.
Too long to read the version
(1) Why choose a rental system?
Based on the judgment of the future of crypto games, how to integrate the experience of non-crypto players and crypto players has become a proposition that needs attention. The leasing system is a feasible way, that is, by allocating funds and time resources between big R players and free players, it allows free players, who account for the vast majority of the player group, to play games more conveniently, and broadens the scope of crypto games. The player market that can be reached. While ensuring that non-crypto players and crypto players have separate experiences, the experience of the two will not be too separated.
(2) Advantages and disadvantages of leasing system
Pros: ①, lower the user threshold; ②, increase the investment willingness of big R; ③, preserve the value of advanced NFT; ④, based on ①, it can target a broader player market;
Disadvantages: ①, industrialization of gold mining; ②, designed output is filled up, triggering currency inflation;
(3) NFT leasing process assumptions
① In order to be more user-friendly for players, it needs to be permissionless and mortgage-free, and it is demonstrated that this is still achievable at the current stage of the crypto game;
② On the premise of grasping the overall goal of the leasing system, design post-paid rent that fluctuates with market demand for the lessor, and design the proportional income of the remaining portion for the lessee. The final remaining portion will flow into the leasing pool as a pledge vesting reward for all lessors. ;
③ Implementation process: The lessor selects the lease period, and the NFT enters the corresponding rental pool → the lessee leases the NFT without permission and without collateral → pays the rent when due (market decision; peer-to-peer payment; paid with in-game output) → withdraws its own proportion of income ( Official or governance system decision)→The remaining part flows back into the pool as a revenue pool for leasing NFT.
(4) Choose the right time to launch the leasing system to achieve second growth
(5) Changes in the leasing system - refer to perpetual bonds, the lessor permanently manages its own NFT
(6) In the process of leasing the system, what parameters can be adjusted by the governance system?
The following is the text——
Recently I’ve been thinking about how to “integrate” different player categories through mechanical design.
What does that mean?
——We can divide the current audience of crypto games into three categories, namely traditional game players, crypto players, and crypto non-players. Considering the behavioral paths of different groups, there are many issues that need to be considered.
Avoid experience fragmentation among different player groups
About the classification of “crypto non-gamers”
Why would I include “crypto non-gamers” as an audience? An obvious consideration is that even if this group does not play games, crypto game tokens will inevitably enter their field of vision and be included in their consideration of investment targets. From the perspective of the crypto non-players group: they will look at the currency with a set of evaluation systems that are different from game cognitive standards, such as transaction activity, circulation size, market value growth space, etc. (rather than tokens output consumption, game rules, etc.); or simply use it as the target of secondary speculation or quantitative trading.
In any case, they will definitely be involved in the crypto game ecosystem. Also, many times the roles are mixed, and there is no clear boundary between crypto players and crypto non-players. This article only artificially divides them for logical clarity.
From the perspective of crypto game design, the crypto non-players group can be liquidity providers, arbitrageurs who contribute to the dynamic balance of the market, and the main force in token speculation, but they can also be the gravediggers at the end of the games life. So regardless, they are still the main group to consider.
Although less convincing based on one samplelatest surveyIt shows that this group of people accounts for less than 3% of the entire player base - also, who doesnt love games?
The separation between traditional gamers and crypto players
To a large extent, traditional gamers are separated from the latter two. The first wave of GameFi did not consider the existence of this group (according to the above survey, accounting for about 81%); after that, although the major chain games are launching free play channels, but at a glance, it is more like Its stitching rather than fusion.
How to organically integrate traditional game players and crypto players so that they can obtain similar and excellent experiences in the game (goal one), while also ensuring the continued stability of the economic system (goal two)? This is something Ive been thinking about some time ago.
An obvious difficulty is that these two goals are often in conflict. The continued stability of the economic system means that the value flowing out of the system needs to maintain a balance with the inflow. And this entrance and exit is too uncontrolled - this is one of the shortcomings caused by the financialization of game assets, because financialization is too dependent on the market, which amplifies the control effect of market sentiment on economic performance. Once the system continues to have a net outflow of value, it will open a Pandoras box of leveraged decline like a money multiplier effect.
This is contradictory to goal one. To maintain a similar experience, free players are required not to have too many gaps in the game, at least in terms of game content. ——Dividing into two branches is the most straightforward method, but it is obviously not perfect and unconvincing. You cant blatantly treat your users differently, at least not in games.
Once the play routes converge, you will face a problem: you cannot let free players also obtain incentive tokens, even if the number is reduced to one percent, otherwise the tragedy of the lemon market will continue to repeat itself. So you can only offer them a completely different in-game currency - lets call it coins. The resulting sense of fragmentation will spread to the entire game.
This fragmentation is everywhere, let’s take an example. If we design a rich appearance system based on the games governance system, how should we set prices for players on both sides? From the perspective of NFT, limited time limited collectibles that can be used in the game to increase governance capabilities may be a very good choice; from the perspective of ordinary players’ in-app purchases, they also paid the cost, but can only Get the look itself. If we pursue fairness, we should give different pricing to the two - this is the so-called sense of fragmentation.
Some other ways, such as allowing ordinary players to pay currency to mint their in-game collectibles into NFTs to compensate for the fragmentation of the player base, will cause more problems. ——For example, adverse selection, that is, only precious non-NFTs will be minted; this will lead to the lemon market, that is, some originally rare NFTs will be ruined.
NFT Lending: Should You Get Into the Game?
The previous section is about some thoughts on integrating player experience.
Obviously, there are many benefits to doing this: bringing more traffic to the game means a stronger community consensus; the increase in player groups brings more value capture - as an Internet product, games enjoy Characteristics of high development costs, low retail costs, and network effects; in addition, please don’t ignore the large number of “consumers” hidden among free players. This is the real trump card.
Therefore, the integration of experiences between crypto players and free-to-play players is imperative in my opinion. We need to solve the difficulties rather than find another way out. This brings us to the topic of this article, because intuitively, NFT lending may become a big idea to solve this problem.
Note: Leasing behavior is still based on the logic of asset income rights, so this article still continues the basic idea of NFT gold mining. Considering that products that use NFT as a pure collection and consumption attribute have appeared on the market (Epic’s first blockchain game Blankos), the development path of crypto games in the future may diverge. So I think its important to emphasize this.
Why do you want to make a rental system?
Should NFT lending be added to the game?(Although this statement is lofty but a bit difficult to pronounce, I will use rental system instead in the following paragraphs)
My earliest personal discussion on NFT lending is actually in Get to know chain games, stepn, and skyweaver experience reports》In this article. At that time, I mentioned that NFT as a ticket was not a wise approach, because it would prevent more players from entering (and also hinder more consumers - anyway, early GameFi did not leave a channel for consumers) ; The leasing system can relieve this restriction, but it will bring new problems-the output will be full.
stepn This example means that if a player buys 30 pairs of shoes, he will most likely not be able to run them to full capacity every day, but if he can rent them to others, he can fully increase his output. In the long run, this is not conducive to the game economy. of.
But as I thought more deeply, I discovered some blind spots:
1. Even if stepn does not have a rental system, it will not solve this problem, because everyone will pay college students to run it. This is actually an off-site rental system. It is human nature to maximize output and make money if you can make it for free. Since it cannot be avoided, why not do it yourself?
2. What is the purpose of the leasing system? I think essentially,What the leasing system accomplishes is resource allocation, that is, the exchange of time and money is realized between the groups with time-rich but insufficient wealth and time-poor but wealth-rich groups. The main needs that the rental system needs to meet are the money-making needs of free gold players, and the socialization/sense of achievement/making money of big R players. Anyway, these are needs that can only be satisfied by continuous playing.
3. Does Big R really have time to play games? In terms of group characteristics, no matter from a social or other perspective, it is impossible for Big R to continue to sit in front of the computer and earn money honestly. On the contrary, after the love period, daily game activities may be replaced by gold mining studios, robots, etc. It’s the old saying – if you can’t avoid it, why not do it yourself?
4. The rental system can release the entrance for free players and promote the game to a broader game market. In the past, there was the Axie Game Guild that supported a generation of Filipinos (although it can no longer support it now). In the past, there were Internet companies that subsidized users in order to compete for the market. Free is a powerful tool for user growth. A product that requires consensus first needs to be supported by a sufficiently broad base of users - you cannot expect a consensus to emerge in a community of hundreds of people, that can only be called common opinion.
5. What if free players can make gold and it will not affect the total output of the system? That is the goals one and two we mentioned before. Similar to the current chain game guild, many players are using their labor time in exchange for rewards, which are divided from NFT owners. The overall output of this type can even be reduced to 90%. The rental system meets the rigid needs of big R and free gold players, so a slightly smaller output is expected to be acceptable.
Advantages and disadvantages of leasing system
Now let’s sort out the advantages and disadvantages of the leasing system:
Advantages: ①, lower the user threshold; ②, increase the investment willingness of big R; ③, based on ①, it can target a broader player market;
Disadvantages: ①, industrialization of gold mining; ②, designed output is filled up, triggering currency inflation;
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages, we will find a magical phenomenon: the advantages affect all external factors; the disadvantages affect more internal factors, and designers can completely avoid these factors through some adjustments.
The first disadvantage is for the industrialization of gold mining.
That is to say, the leasing system is designed for free players. If the leasing is profitable, it will attract a large number of robots to occupy the magpies nest - not only will the original design purpose not be achieved, but it will also collapse the game economy. So, from what angles can the problem be solved?
(1) Set participation thresholds.
Where should the threshold come from? This threshold should not shut them out, but should show a desire to reject them in return for welcoming them. For example, if free players are asked to provide wallet addresses and the algorithm conducts investigations based on address activities, it can certainly kick out most robots, but it will cause the problem of turning them out - most tenants may come from Non-crypto group, where do you ask them to get active wallets?
For example, if you add a verification code system every time you log in, you can eliminate robots and there is no turning away, but there is no rejection but welcome.
For example, set several random tasks for the tenant. If the task cannot be completed during the rental period, the output will be confiscated; if the task difficulty is moderate, random enough, and interesting enough, this is a good method.
For another example, free players need enough game activity to meet the prerequisites of the rental system. ——This seems disgusting from our point of view, but imagine a non-crypto player who has never been exposed to the concept of gold making, especially ordinary players who have no desire to recharge, will this setting arouse them? What about your interest? After all, renting NFT has changed from an official feature to a small game goal.
(2) Does the lessee have to be profitable?
If the main target group of the rental function is free players in web2, it is actually completely unnecessary. If you agree with my previous discussion, you will find that it is enough to keep the two gameplay experiences intact. As a result, players who lease NFT will have all their output delivered to the lessor after the lease expires, or he can keep a small part of it.
(3) Limit robots.
If in the end, free players can still have sex for free, then restrictions on bots will be needed. How to limit it? There are many ways. Let me come up with a weird method. Suppose the lease period is one month, and the output is required to be released after one month. Then, at the end of the lease period, a Turing test will be conducted. Will the robot fail? Sorry for the asset confiscation. Thank you for your contribution to the game. Your output, together with other respectable contributors, will be sent to all players as red envelopes during the holidays. Listen to me thank you...
The second disadvantage is that design output is stretched
I think this has whetted everyones appetite. Payback in 50 days is too slow. Calculated by the interest rate, the daily profit is already 2%. Some would say Ben is depreciating... think about why.
Of course, when it comes to specific solutions, I have laid the groundwork for this, namely: the leasing system meets the rigid needs of big R players and free gold players, so a slightly smaller output is expected to be acceptable. Suppose we adjust the output to 80% of normal, of which 20% is given to lessees and 60% is given to lessors; for Big R, this is still a good making money opportunity; for games, there are no benefits. Hurt; for renters, while nice, seems slightly under-incentivized.
btw. To add a paragraph, compared with traditional interest rates, if the annualized return exceeds 20%, there is a risk of principal loss. According to the calculation of the aforementioned big R profit, 20% / 60% / 365 is not exciting enough for crypto, but even if it is increased 10 times, the daily profit is only 0.9%, which is 110 days to pay back, which is even for many people. Not enough to see...
According to my point of view,This appetite must be suppressed, otherwise it is better to play purely consumer NFT games, such as blankos, which still sell well - Crypto Game really has no obligation to let players pay back their money in 100 days. If you insist on saying that it is better to buy financial management to get back your capital in 100 days, then...
By the way, the annualized return on capital in 100 days is 365%. Considering the depreciation trend, it varies from game to game; while the annualized return of p2p thunder is about 80%...
Tenant incentives
Back to the issue of tenant incentives.
As mentioned earlier, players who lease NFT should hand over most of their output to the lessor. In order to give him more incentives, we give him more options. For example, he can now choose to purchase the assets he generates using leased NFTs at a discount.
Based on the above assumptions, let us take an example. If the holder wants to rent an NFT, he must first select the rental period (given 5 days, 1 month, 3 months, and one year); the reward coefficients corresponding to different rental periods are different. For example, 5 days can only be used normally. 40% of the output, 60% in 1 month, 80% in 3 months, and 100% in one year. After selecting the lease period, the NFT enters the corresponding lease pool and begins to obtain linearly vested income (represented by the pledge income of the NFT pledged into the lease pool), which is the remaining part of all income in the leasing system. Considering that if the pledge income vests in different lease periods, the shorter the lease period pool, the higher the income will be obtained; therefore, the income will be distributed in the total lease pool according to the value of the NFT itself.
A non-crypto player (or a crypto free player), after playing the free route for a period of time, will achieve a certain in-game achievement, no matter which dungeon is pushed to, which boss is killed, or how many people are active every day. , in short, after some suitable conditions and the right time, they have the qualification to lease NFT for free.
So they entered the leasing system and saw a marketplace-like interface in front of them, where they could filter the leasing period, rent, NFT itself, etc. After selecting the NFT of their choice (including the lease period), they canLease without license, you only need to pay the rent from the output and withdraw your own proportion of income after the lease period expires.
Even further, after the lease expires, the lessee becomes in love with the lessor and wants to directly keep the lessor’s NFT. What should be done? I think there is a way, but it requires a price increase, such as 120% of the market price. Because the lessee is willing to increase the price to buy it, it proves that the NFT has special feelings for it and can accept a higher price; while the lessor uses the loss of an NFT asset (the favorite NFT is not expected to be rented out) in exchange for probabilistic gains. Bonus, turned around to face his warehouse of 10,000 NFTs and smiled happily.
NFT leasing process assumptions
Speaking of the leasing process, it seems to be different from the existing NFT lending process.
Unsecured, license-free design
A distinctive feature is that it is mortgage-free and requires no permission.Why is it designed this way?
Compared with existing NFT lending (of course, most of them use NFT as collateral), it does not fill the actual demand - why should I rent an NFT? And mortgage a large amount of assets into the agreement in order to rent this NFT?
The former problem is temporarily unsolvable in non-game scenarios (the scenario itself has a lot of imagination, but there is currently no mature on-chain leasing market); the latter problem is because the trust-free environment ensured by the algorithm does not exist. It cannot solve the zero-cost identity currently represented by on-chain addresses.
Why do most on-chain loans use inefficient over-collateralization? The obvious reason is that,The loss of identity anchoring results in the inability to build a credit system.A simple script can easily create hundreds or thousands of anonymous addresses. Even if the behavior of these addresses is analyzed, if the users behind them have high technical anti-reconnaissance awareness, they cannot confirm the true identities behind these addresses. Anchored. It is impossible to build a credit system in such an environment. Without credit, there will be no low-cost finance.
Combining these two points, the emergence of universal NFT lending protocols at this stage can only be said to be premature.
In the game, these two problems can be perfectly solved.
Why can games easily create rental demand? Because games are equivalent to creating a world based on human entertainment choices. Once users enter this world, they will operate according to the world view settings to obtain the feedback they need. If you can’t own a game asset for the time being, but still want to use it, leasing is a natural choice.
So why don’t in-game rentals require a mortgage? Its very simple, because the players behavior in the game is the mortgage, the players character development, the materials in the backpack, and the completed mission records, all of these are. Regardless of the fact that current crypto games still run on centralized servers, even if it is a complete on-chain game, players cannot bet on their own accumulation (credit) in the game. ——If you don’t return it after renting it, you just don’t want to play the game anymore, so why did you rent it?
Postpaid rent, fixed income
The other one, post-paid rent, fixed income.
First, consider a normal leasing process: take renting a house as an example, the lessee rents the house, pays 1,000 U.S. dollars for it, and then moves out when the lease expires; take the chain game guild as an example, renting out assets, and the income is distributed proportionally. As for the latter, it is postpaid rent, but it is not a fixed amount - generally, the interest on the leased property is obtained by the lessee, that is to say, the income received by the lessor is actually the rent paid by the lessee.
Why do I think lessors should get a fixed amount of rent?
Assuming that the lessor pays proportional rent, this means that the lessors income actually depends on the lessees gold production; and for the lessee, the incentive to earn more output is not strong - anyway, it is all the time Admission is free. Lessors should be more risk-averse than lessees with no collateral or permission, and so need to lock in their returns.
In turn, should the lessee receive the remainder?
If I answer here, yes, the result will be: the lessee fights harder and harder, completely reaches the designed output, and obtains the output corresponding to his own labor, and becomes a serf and sings. It seems wonderful, but Im sorry, Im a designer, and I cant let you maximize your design output (unless you lower the upper limit by half in advance).
Therefore, on the basis of the previous discussion, I will make another cut here: the lessee can obtain proportional income, but the base is the output after deducting rent.
Nani?
Let us review the purpose of the leasing system: to meet the needs of big R to make money, to meet the needs of free players, and to open the game to a broader market. If the rent is not deducted first, there will be an embarrassing situation in which the lessee fishes and the output cannot pay the rent; even if the output may still be insufficient to pay the rent in the end, in terms of priority assurance, the rent that floats in the market still comes first. . On this basis, if the output is insufficient to rent, the lessor will only suffer losses. However, this is not a common situation, and we will deal with the reputation of the lessee accordingly.
——It doesn’t matter how hard the tenant works, right? (Ah, I am so heartless)
In fact, from the perspective of free players, rent a set of NFT without permission and mortgage. After the lease expires, use the output to pay the rent, and then take part of it yourself. It is really free, so why not?
Peer to pool income
So in the end, when the lessor and the lessee respectively withdraw their own income from the leasing activity, what should be done with the remaining portion?
First, rule out giving it directly to the lessor or lessee, otherwise all the previous work will be in vain; then consider whether there is a third party worthy of reward. After thinking about it, I thought that there is no agency here; finally I thought about going to a pool, after all, everything is not If you know how to deal with it, you can throw it into the pool first and then make further plans.
So he threw it into the pool.
existMorphoIn this article, I compared in detail the differences between peer-to-peer lending and peer-to-pool lending. The advantages of the latter include: instant liquidity, stable interest generation (for lenders), transparent interest rates, no maturity date, etc. ; Disadvantages include low capital utilization efficiency, large lending spreads, and lack of market regulation of interest rates.
For crypto games, low capital utilization efficiency and large lending spreads are good things, which means there is less selling pressure on tokens. Under the peer-to-pool model, everyone can free ride easily. I think there is a dynamic equilibrium process here: lessees free riding → lessors’ income decreases → fewer lessors → lessors are in short supply → rents rise → it is difficult for lessees to free ride →…
andMore instant matching, perhaps is the more core requirement.
Of course, strictly speaking, the lender does not need to use cash to pay interest, but rather through in-game assets that he earns by leasing the NFT.
Review again: Are the interests of the lessor and the lessee well taken care of?
For the lessee, there is no license and no mortgage, free play and gold, and finally earn some proportional income. For them, whether the income is fixed or not, or even how much the income is, is not a qualitative difference; the core difference is that they can experience some features of NFT assets for free, play for free, and receive monetary incentives.
To the lessor, you can rent out your excess NFT and earn income while sitting there. What is the lessor’s core concern?
Earnings and asset security.
(1) First, asset safety. Since there is no permission and no mortgage, the lessor needs to know that it is safe to lend out his NFT; this is easy to guarantee. If your game uses a self-built wallet similar to stepn/skyweaver, you can directly prohibit the transfer of NFT in the rental system. ; Suppose your game is to jump to a web page and link to the players own wallet (then there is no such thing as a non-crypto player as mentioned above = =)... There seems to be no way, but this contradicts the premise of the entire discussion. , I don’t think future crypto games will not need to consider non-crypto players, and I think it will also be a trend to build games themselves or use third-party wallets to interface with account systems.
As for permissionlessness, it is mainly to improve the matching efficiency between borrowers and lenders; the permission behavior is completed once when the lessor adds the NFT to the lending pool. You dont have to give me permission, its not necessary.
(2) Then there are the benefits. This area seems to be lacking, because the lessor only receives fixed income (rent), which inevitably leads to insufficient incentives. Consider two points:
①The rent fluctuates with the market. The word fixed refers to the income that is fixed in advance, rather than the actual amount. For example, if a player builds a super Bobo gun, it is expected to produce 400 coins, but when the lessor lists the super Bobo gun, the rent has already been marked, for example, U equivalent to 300 coins. If the lessee chooses to rent, it means that he will have to pay 300 U at the end of the lease.
What? You said the currency has dropped? All the lessees output cannot satisfy 300 U?
There are two possibilities: 1. The currency price fell sharply during this period, and the output was normal but insufficient; 2. There was no normal output at all, and the lessee was lazy. At this time, the system design needs to start with the lessee first, otherwise problems may easily arise. For example, it is stipulated that after the lessee withdraws the income, if the remaining balance is less than the agreed rent, all the remaining balance should be paid to the lessor and compensated from the pool or simply ignored; at this time, the lessee can do nothing and still not take the money, which is not acceptable. And if it is agreed to give priority to satisfying the lessor, the lessee will work hard to make money. Otherwise, not to mention the loss of opportunities for the lessor, his work will be in vain. This is one; secondly, if he is still dissatisfied with the rent, the lessee will not rent, and the demand will decrease. Let rents also decrease until the market returns to a state of dynamic equilibrium.
②Supplementary income. Pure rent seems almost meaningless. Think about this experience: you deposit your treasure somewhere and agree to keep it for three months. You will collect the interest after three months and decide whether to renew the deposit - are you familiar with it? This is not just a fixed deposit!
From an experience point of view, periodic rent is not conducive to the retention of the lessor, because the incentive experience given by periodic rent is discontinuous - the lessor only obtains happiness on the day when the rent is withdrawn; and if there is a pool, the lessor will continue to receive Attribution rewards can extend this experience.
What if the remaining part of the income distribution is used to assume the role of the pool of vested rewards?
There are currently four rental pools (mentioned above).
So the design idea of such a rental system can be put together:
The lessor thus obtains double benefits (although the absolute value is not necessarily very high): first, the rent payment that will inevitably occur when leasing, which will be adjusted according to market demand and paid upon maturity; second, the rental pool pledge rewards that will inevitably be obtained when leasing, Continuous vesting.
Lessees have the money ability to make gold for free. Although it is not much, it should be noted that the main group of this system is non-crypto players, and the main purpose is to integrate the gaming experience of different groups.
For games, the output based on the rigid demand for leasing has weakened and even reduced the total output.
How to add? Where to add it? and subsequent thoughts
Coming to the next question: How to add it? Where to add it?
How to add?
Including: Which assets are included in the lease scope? In what way?
Let’s first look at the scope of included assets. The assets in the crypto game basically come from NFTs and tokens corresponding to various items in the game. If the NFTs are classified in detail, main NFTs (based on the existing GameFi idea, that is, NFTs used for gold farming), secondary NFTs (from gems, etc.) Items with auxiliary functions), appearance NFT, prop NFT, management NFT (such as badges, collection items, etc.). Suitable for leasing include main NFT and appearance NFT.
For appearance NFTs, leasing needs to occur in a more mature market (to put it bluntly, when the game has enough players), and the tenant’s psychology is similar to the real world; of course, if the appearance NFT has some small, With magical empowerment, the nature of the market is completely different.
The main thing is to look at the main NFT. Coming to the second question, how to rent?
In the traditional definition of ownership, it is divided into four categories: possession, use, income, and disposal, which can be vaguely mapped to the four directions of holding, playing, gold mining, and trading. Generally speaking, gaming and gold mining are highly overlapping. Leasing means the transfer of play rights. The lessee pays rent in exchange for play rights, just like renting out a house. This brings up several problems:
①The lessee cannot change the NFT itself through in-game behavior;
②Does the lessee necessarily need to obtain a part of the final income?
Consider ②, do users need to pay rent for leasing? Because users can rent discs to watch movies, rent equipment, and even rent steam accounts to play games, but you can’t expect players to spend money renting NFTs to play shit. When the product is difficult to attract more users, charging is not a good strategy. This is also why the existing guild ecology has been formed: players can also make money by leasing. (No one has compared this difference. Shouldn’t the ideal logic of renting NFT be the same as renting a CD? Experience economy hhh)
In short, this creates a new problem: the lessee effectively becomes an “employee.” As early as the beginning of the development of modern enterprise theory, economists have debated the compensation model between employees and bosses, generally believing that the risk-loving party obtains residual income. In short, the boss takes higher risks, so the employees only receive a fixed salary and the boss gets excess returns. However, if employees can only receive a fixed salary, who has the incentive to do more work for the boss? This is where the salary incentive system comes in, with options, commissions, and other options.
But the economy in the real world is a circle. Everyone plays the role of consumer and producer at the same time. Everyone is the terminal of other product lines. This relationship is difficult to exist in games. If employees are more motivated and produce more, it will be detrimental to the entire economic system. I should have mentioned this in detail before. (I found that the structure of this article was a bit Mobius, and I started to panic)
In short, the lessee does not have to obtain a part of the final income. This is considered as a player; but as a part of the production behavior, the lessee must obtain a part of the final income. The details have been discussed previously and will not be explained in detail.
Regarding the rental method, I actually still have some thoughts. I originally wanted to put it in the front, but the water in front seemed to be gurgling down, so I didn’t know where to put it. I finally decided to put it here. Anyway, I guess not many brothers can read the article because it is so long. to the back. (This is so Mobius)
Therefore, the actual leasing process is:The lessor chooses the lease period, and the NFT enters the corresponding rental pool → the lessee leases the NFT without permission and without collateral → pays the rent when due (market decision; peer-to-peer payment; paid with in-game output) → withdraws its own fixed income (official or governance system Decision) → The remaining income is returned to the pool as the income pool for renting NFT.
This logic makes sense.
Where to add it?
Refers to when the rental system will be online, after the game is online, or after a period of time?
To answer this question, we need to go back to what we just said, what the leasing system can bring: lowering the user threshold and opening up to a broader player market; increasing the willingness to invest in big R; industrializing gold mining; maximizing design output, triggering monetary inflation;
After the game is launched, will it be suitable? INO is the first NFT player in the game. If INO does not meet expectations, dont rent the system yet. Now lets assume that a very popular game has 1,000 people outside of INO and 10,000 people want to come in. At this time, the game is online. What will happen if the game is rented? First of all, the initial NFT and token prices will be driven very high because new entrants need NFT; those who dislike the high price will rent it, so the rent will also be driven up. When the demand was almost exhausted, the first 1,000 people were flooded, and none of the goals of the leasing system were achieved...
What about after it goes online for a while? Assume that the same INO 1000 has 10000 outside. After a period of time after being online, as new NFTs are produced, market sentiment gradually calms down, and the economy begins to enter a period of positive circulation after a high degree of shock. There is always an inflection point in this forward cycle. Under the p2e framework, that is when the new flow rate begins to weaken. The leasing system is suitable to be launched at this time. According to Internet slang, it is called finding the second growth point.
The group targeted by the rental system is the 81% mentioned at the beginning of this article. Through the leasing system, excess NFTs are stored and new players can pour in at zero cost. Since the new player group has its own consumer role, their entry is also expected to bring about a more stable economic cycle and even a new wave of economic growth.
Lessor threshold
As mentioned above, in order to prevent robots from crowding out normal leasing demand, the lessee needs to set a participation threshold. What about the lessor?
The threshold for lessors should probably be reflected in NFTs. Considering that under the current settings, the main practical use of NFT in the game is to make gold, mid- and low-level NFTs generally correspond to individual gamers and are rarely idle; players who will restrict NFTs are basically in the mid-to-high user level. Such as big R. If all NFTs are allowed to be rented, it will greatly increase the load of the leasing system. Once an oversupply situation occurs, the benefits will be handed over to robots; in addition, considering that the output is full, this is not conducive to NFT realizing its own water storage function.
If only mid-to-high-level NFT leasing is allowed, on the one hand, it will return the leasing system to a healthy state, on the other hand, it will improve the positioning of the leasing system itself in the minds of players, and on the other hand, it will also promote the consumption of low-level NFTs.
Script processing
The premise of the rental system is to have a script processing mechanism in place. After all, if idle NFTs can be scripted to generate income, then the leasing system with obviously lower total income will not be competitive.
Considering the lessors behavior in dealing with excess NFT, there are three options, selling, using and leasing.
In order for leasing to be the best option, leasing needs to bring the greatest benefits. However, in the existing design, the lessor can only obtain a part of the script income (full income) when leasing, and it is not necessarily better than selling.
Path A is to find ways to limit scripts; Path B is to make leasing the most profitable.
Path A:
Restriction scripts only need to be targeted at the lessor group. For lessees, even if they use the script to gain free profits, it will only fill a gap in the market; once there are insufficient lessors or too many lessees, the rent will be raised, and the script cannot do anything about it. Unlimited brushing.
Limiting scripts should first find the script behavior. Designing a Turing test for scripts requires operations that humans can easily accomplish but scripts cannot distinguish. For example, for players who spend more than 2 hours grinding gold every day (assuming that most players are within 2 hours), a random pop-up message Choose what kind of monster did you kill today? will pop up during non-combat time. This is based on graphic verification, but two corrections are made. :
(1) Graphics are related to the game. For example, Choose the monster you have brushed today ensures randomness (random pop-ups, random graphics) while keeping the experience from jumping out of the game;
(2) Cognitive correction, change Verification for Script to Randomly Appeared Questions and Answers with Prizes. After making the correct choice, you can spend gas to receive the reward (or not receive it). Since the lessor must be a web3 player, it is OK to sign in and pay gas.
Path B:
1. Add additional income to leasing. It cant be about output. If the output is increased and people are stimulated to rent, it will lead to abnormal behavior, and ultimately the overall output will be increased. It can be governance-oriented, such as improving reputation points, such as giving appearance NFT lottery draws when conditions are met. wait.
2. Add penalties to the script. If the players cheating behavior can be discovered through the logs, there is no need to ban the account and mark the corresponding equipment. The corresponding equipment cannot be produced within X days unless it enters the three-month rental pool.
3. For equipment whose total lease term reaches a certain amount, the handling fee will be reduced or exempted when selling.
Of course, there are more issues worthy of discussion in these measures, and they are only used to inspire others.
Why not make it a perpetual bond?
A problem not mentioned above is that after the output of the leasing system is given to lessors, it is difficult to control them from poaching, raising and selling. Due to the previous assumption that NFT is locked during the rental process (otherwise it is easy to cause problems, such as the lessee washing some without authorization), it is difficult for most renters to receive incentives to continue to provide NFT upgrade.
In addition, the leasing system is equivalent to saving a part of NFT, but the willingness to retain this part of NFT is not enough. As mentioned above, the income of the leasing system is discounted on the basis of full output, and can only be obtained through some non-material Incentive to promise bonuses. When the lessor takes the NFT out of the pool, attributes that do not match its own development status will not encourage the lessor to develop the NFT in one go, but will instead be more inclined to sell it directly. As the saying goes, The childhood sweetheart who left home is no longer a good match when he returns.
——It’s better to leave and never come back. What if the rental system was made into a more powerful black hole version?
That is, when a player chooses to rent an NFT, it is equivalent to exchanging the NFT for a perpetual annual interest bond. After that, you will only receive rent and loan pool proceeds, but the NFT can never be withdrawn from the pool. It is equivalent to the loan pool being permanently managed by the official or governance system. On the lessees side, it is still a normal leasing process.
Introducing a governance system
I won’t go into too much detail about this for now. The obvious ones that can be thought of include using reputation points to create a virtual credit system and giving some governance rights bonuses to this credit; or in terms of script processing, judging scripts based on indicators such as governance activity and reputation points. wait. I will expand on it further in the future, mainly because this article is already nearly 10,000 words long (mainly because it is late at night), so we cannot close ourselves up and look forward to more exchanges and inspirations.
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