SEC官员称比特币以太坊不是证券，提出6大判断标准

编者按：本文来自 BiaNews （ID：bianews8），作者： BiaNews ，星球日报经授权转载。

Bianews报道 当地时间6月14日，美国证券交易委员会(SEC)企业融资部门负责人William Hinman，在雅虎金融全球市场峰会上发表加密货币相关的演讲，主题《数字资产交易：当Howey遇到Gary Plastic》。

演讲中，William Hinman表示，将联邦证券法的披露制度应用于比特币的发行和转售或应用于以太坊的当前交易中，都没有价值。他指出，从以太网络极其分散的去中心化结构来看，以太目前的交易、销售都不是证券交易。

他指出，发起人为筹集资金而开发数字资产可在其上运行的网络，通常会出售代币，在许多情况下，这样做的经济实质与传统证券产品相同。募集资金的目的是希望发起人能够建立自己的系统，而投资者可以从中获得回报。

William Hinman称SEC将帮助发起人和律师解决评估特定数字资产交易是否涉及证券销售的问题，并准备提供更正式的解释或无行动指导，以便在拟议的使用中恰当描述数字资产。

他还指出，了解有关第三方的重要信息：其背景、融资、计划、财务等等，都是做出明智的投资决策的先决条件。如果没有一个监管框架来促进披露第三方对这些话题的了解以及与投资相关的风险，投资者将不知情，并很容易处于风险之中。

William Hinman还在演讲中提出评估一个数字资产是否可作为证券时需要考虑的因素：

1、是否有任何人士或团体赞助或推动数字资产的发行及销售，而这些人或团体所做的努力在资产的发展、维护及增值方面是否扮演重要角色?

2、该个人或团体是否持有数字资产的股份或其他权益，以促使其增加数字资产的价值?购买者是否会合理地相信将会有努力使项目推进，并可能使他们在数字资产上的投资获得回报?

3、发起人筹集的资金是否超过了建立一个功能网络所需的资金？如果能筹集到足够资金，是否表明这些资金可以用于支持令牌价值或增加企业价值?发起人是否继续从收益或在操作中支出资金，以提高令牌运行系统的功能或价值？

4、购买者是在寻求回报吗?发起人是否以合理价格向公众而不是网络潜在用户销售数字资产?

5、《证券法》的保护是否合理?在数字资产中，发起人和潜在购买者/投资者之间是否存在信息不对称？

6、发起人以外的个人或团队是否行使治理权或发挥有意义的影响力?

数字资产交易：当Howey遇到Gary Plastic

By：William Hinman

很高兴今天能来到这里。这提供了一个很好的机会来讨论一个在新闻界和加密社区中引起相当大争论的话题：数字资产是否可以作为一种证券，并且是否会随着时间的推移，超越证券意义。

首先，我们应该以不同的方式提出问题，不要仅限于数字资产本身，而应关注数字资产的周围环境及其销售方式。为此，一种更好的调查方式是:“最初在证券发行中提供的数字资产，以后能否以不构成证券发行的方式出售?” 

如果数字资产代表一组使持有者在企业中获得财务利益的权利的情况下，答案很可能是否定的。在这些情况下，将这笔交易称为最初代币发行，或首次代币发行，或出售代币，将不会使其脱离美国证券法的管辖范围。

但是，如果不再有任何中央企业被投资或者销售数字资产，而仅仅是为了通过它所创建的网络购买一个好的服务，那又是什么情况呢？我相信在这些情况下，答案是积极的。今天，我想和你们分享我对可能发生的情况的一些看法。

在谈到证券法分析之前，让我分享一下我认为分布式分类账技术最令人兴奋的地方，即它在分散的数字环境中共享信息、传递价值和记录交易的潜力。潜在的应用包括供应链管理、知识产权许可、股权转让以及其他无数的应用。创建的应用程序是具有真正价值的，可以通过公开的、不可篡改的记录以电子方式访问和执行，而不需要可信的第三方来验证事务。

有些人认为，这项技术将改变我们现在所知道的电子商务。这项新技术引起了人们的兴奋，人们对此也产生了大量的投机兴趣。然而不幸的是，现在仍存在一些欺诈案例。也就是说在很多方面，它仍然处于早期阶段。

但我来这里不是为了讨论技术的前景，今天在座的很多人都可以做得更好。我想把重点放在联邦证券法律对数字资产交易的应用上——这就是代币是如何发行、分发和出售的。虽然这个话题可能比区块链所给出的承诺要简单一些，但这个话题对于更广泛地接受和使用这些新工具来说至关重要。

首先我将描述我经常看到的内容。发起人为了筹集资金开发数字资产将运行的网络，通常出售代币，而不是出售股票、发行纸币或获得银行融资。但是，在许多情况下，经济实质与传统证券产品相同。

募集资金的目的是希望发起人能够建立自己的系统，投资者可以从中获得回报：通常是通过在二级市场上出售他们的代币，一旦发起人用收益创造了有价值的东西，数字企业的价值就会增加。

当我们看到这种经济交易时，很容易就能应用美国证券交易委员会诉Howey案中首先宣布的最高法院的“投资合同”的测试。该测试需要我们在普通企业中投资金钱，并期望从他人的努力中获得利润。

反思一下Howey案的事实也是很重要的。

一家酒店运营商向客人出售了一家柑橘园的权益，并声称它出售的是房地产，而不是证券。虽然交易记录为房地产销售，但还包括一份培养和收获橙子的服务合同。买家本来可以安排自己为果园服务，但事实上，多数买家都是被动的，他们只能依靠Howey-in-the-Hills 服务公司的努力来获得回报。

最高法院在阐明对投资合同的测试时强调：“形式(被)无视于实质，重点(被)放在经济现实上。”因此，所谓的房地产购买被认为是一项投资合同，在这种情况下，在橘园的投资就是一种对证券的投资。

就像在Howey的案例中一样，代币通常被吹捧为具有自身用途的资产，并承诺这些资产将以一种会使它们增值的方式加以培育，并在以后以盈利的方式出售。而且，就像Howey案中Howey所做的那样，林子里的利益是卖给酒店客人的，而不是卖给农民的，代币通常是卖给广泛的受众，而不是卖给那些可能在网络上使用它们的人。

在我所看到的首次代币发行中，绝大多数的推动者都吹嘘他们有能力创建一个区块链技术的创新应用程序。就像Howey一样，投资者通常都是被动的。营销工作很少针对代币用户。

通常在一开始，应用程序的商业模式和可行性仍然是不确定的。购买者通常别无选择，只能依靠发起人的努力来建立网络并使企业获得成功。在这个阶段，购买一个代币看起来很像对企业成功的赌注，而不是购买用于在网络上交换商品或服务的东西。

另外，你可能会问，考虑到这些代币销售通常看起来像证券发行，为什么发起人选择将投资打包为代币呢？如果代币能发货作用的网络尚未运行，这是一个特别好的问题。我认为造成这种情况的原因有很多种。一段时间以来，一些人认为这种标签本身可能会将其交易从证券法中移除。

我认为人们现在已经认识到将投资机会标记为代币并不能达到这一效果。其次，这种标签可能被用来为企业带来一些营销“噱头”。这在某种程度上仍然有效，但首次代币发行的记录仍在整理中，而现在有些噱头可能更多地成为对投资者潜在的警告信号。

一些人可能会被一个区块链的众筹过程所吸引。数字资产可以成为一种有效的方式来接触全球受众，初始购买者对网络的成功有着重要的影响并会成为其中的一部分，他们的参与也增加了投资贡献之外的价值。然后进行数字资产交换。

对于一些人来说，这可以帮助他们找到新应用程序的市场价格; 对另外一些人来说，这样可以在这场冒险中进行投机。正如我将要讨论的那样，二级市场上的代币交易是否构成或能否出售证券，需要谨慎和事实敏感的法律分析。

我相信一些行业参与者开始意识到，在某些情况下，以更传统的方式启动基于区块链的企业可能会更容易一些。换句话说，通过注册或豁免股权或债务发行来执行初始资金，并且一旦网络启动并运行的话，则将会向需要网络和数字资产提供功能的参与者分发或提供基于区块链的代币。这使得代币的结构和提供方式更明显，而购买者并没有对企业的发展进行投资。

让我们再回到首次代币发行的问题上，严格地说，我看到的代币或是任何被称为数字信息东西，本身并不是证券，就像Howey的橙林就不是。确定证券是否被出售的核心是它如何被出售的以及购买者的合理期望是什么。当有人买房子住时，就不能说这是证券投资。但在某些情况下，同样的资产可以以一种方式提供和出售，从而使投资者根据其他人的努力获得合理的利润预期。

例如，如果住房单位提供管理合同或其他服务，它就可以是一种证券的行为。同样，Gary Plastic案例告诉我们仪器可以作为证券投资合同的一部分：如果豁免根据“证券法”第3条被视为证券的CD作为由经纪人组织计划的一部分出售的话，该经纪人为散户投资者承诺：提供流动性并可能从利率变化中获利。将这些交易作为证券交易进行监管是有合理依据的。

证券法的推动作用是消除发起人和投资者之间的信息不对称。在公开发行中，证券法规定投资者需要作出知情的投资决策，而发起人对招股材料中的重大错误陈述负有责任。这些都是重要的保障措施，它们适用于大多数的首次代币发行。根据联邦证券法的披露，这些信息很好地补充了Howey投资合同关于其他人努力的内容。作为投资者，企业的成功以及实现投资收益的能力，将转化为第三方的努力。

因此，了解有关第三方的重要信息：其背景，融资，计划，财务等等，都是做出明智的投资决策的先决条件。如果没有一个监管框架来促进披露第三方对这些话题的了解以及与投资相关的风险，投资者将不知情，并很容易处于风险之中。

但这也说明数字资产交易不再代表证券产品。如果令牌或代币要在其上发挥作用的网络是充分分散的，则购买人期望某个人或团体进行重要的管理或为此努力将不再合理，这些资产可能不能代表投资合同。

此外，当第三方的努力不再是决定企业成败的关键因素时，物质信息的不对称性就会消退。当网络变得真正去中心化时，识别发行方或推广方以进行必要的披露的能力就变得困难，也就不那么有意义了。

因此，当我今天看到比特币时，我没有看到一个核心第三方的努力是企业的关键决定因素的。比特币功能所在的网络已经运行了一段时间，可能从一开始就分散了。将联邦证券法的披露制度应用于比特币的发行和转售似乎没有什么价值。[9]，撇开以太坊融资筹建，基于我对以太现状的理解，以太网络及其分散的结构，以太目前的交易、销售都不是证券交易。而且，就像比特币一样，将联邦证券法的披露制度应用于以太的当前交易似乎没有什么价值。

随着时间的推移，可能会有其他充分分散的网络和系统，在这些网络和系统中，可能不需要对作为证券作用的令牌或代币进行监管。当然，仍将有一些系统依赖于核心参与者，他们的努力是企业成功的关键。在这种情况下，证券法的适用保护了购买令牌或代币的投资者。

我想强调的是，判断某物是否为证券的分析不是静态的，也不是严格地针对该工具进行的。[10]即使它的功能仅是作为分散网络交易中的数字资产，也可以作为一种证券的投资策略进行打包和出售。如果比特币的推广者将比特币放在基金或信托基金中，并出售其权益，就会产生一种新的证券。同样，只要投资者合理地期望发起人的努力能带来利润，投资合同几乎可以从任何资产(包括虚拟资产)中获得。

让我强调前面的一点：简单地将数字资产标记为“实用令牌（Utility Token）”并不会使该资产变成不是证券的东西。[11]我承认，最高法院已经承认，如果有人购买的资产仅用于消费，那它很可能不是一种证券。但是，交易中的经济实质总是决定了法律分析，而不是标签。

Howey的橙子有效用。又或者，举一个我最喜欢的例子，欧盟委员会在上世纪60年代末就对以威士忌仓库收据形式出售投资合同发出了警告。[14]发起人将收据卖给美国投资者，以资助苏格兰威士忌的酿造和混合过程。

威士忌是真实存在的——而且，对某些人来说，它的效用是非常高的。但Howey不卖橙子，而仓库收据的推广者也不卖供消费的威士忌。他们出售投资项目机会，购买者期望从发起人的努力中得到回报。

发起人和其他市场参与者需要了解特定数字资产的交易是否涉及证券的销售。我们很乐意帮助发起人和他们的律师解决这些问题。我们准备提供更正式的解释或无行动的指导，以便在拟议的使用中恰当描述数字资产。

此外，我们认识到，根据联邦证券法，某一特定资产被视为一种证券，有许多含义。例如，我们的贸易、市场和投资管理部门主要关注的是经销商、交易所和基金注册等问题，以及市场操纵、托管和估值等问题。我们理解市场参与者正在努力使他们的服务符合现有的监管框架，我们很高兴继续参与这一过程。

在评估一个数字资产是否作为投资合同，并因此成为证券时，需要考虑哪些因素?

首先，考虑是否有无论是个人、实体还是协调一致的群体等第三方推动了回报的预期。这一问题将取决于具体的事实和情况，而这一清单是说明性的，并非详尽无遗：

1、是否有任何人士或团体赞助或推动数字资产的发行及销售，而这些人或团体的努力在资产的发展、维护及增值方面是否扮演重要角色?

2、该个人或团体是否持有数字资产的股份或其他权益，以促使其增加数码资产的价值?购买者是否会合理地相信这些努力将会进行，并可能使他们在数字资产上的投资获得回报?

3、发起人是否筹集的资金超过了建立一个功能网络所需的资金？如果能筹集到足够资金，是否表明这些资金可以用于支持令牌的价值或增加企业的价值?发起人是否继续从收益或操作中支出资金，以提高令牌运行的系统的功能或价值？

4、购买者是在寻求回报吗?在这方面，是否以合理地价格向公众而不是向网络的潜在用户销售数字资产?

5、《证券法》的保护是否合理?在数字资产中，发起人和潜在购买者/投资者之间是否存在信息不对称？

6、发起人以外的个人或实体是否行使治理权或有意义的影响力?

虽然这些因素在分析任何第三方的角色时都很重要，但是用合同或技术方式来构建数字资产，功能更像消费品，缺乏证券性。我们再次考虑交易的经济实质，但发起人及其顾问应考虑这些和其他可能的特征。

这份清单并不打算能详尽无遗，我也绝不认为需要提出这些因素中的每一个，以证明令牌是不是证券。 该清单旨在促使发起人及其律师进行思考，并开始与员工进行对话 ，它并不意味着是法律分析中所有必要因素的清单。

1.令牌创建是否与满足用户的需求，或者符合预期？

2.独立行为者是否设定了价格，或者支持资产二级市场的或以其他方式影响交易的推动者？

3. 与投资相比，购买数字资产的主要动机是供个人需要或消费？购买者是否就他们的消费意图而不是投资意图作出了陈述？这些令牌是否与消费与投资意图相关的增量可用？

4. 令牌是否以满足用户需求的方式分发？例如，令牌是否可以按照购买者的预期用途进行持有或转让？是否有内置的激励措施可以迫使网络上的令牌迅速使用，例如让令牌随着时间的推移而降低价值，还是令牌可以长时间保持投资？

5. 资产是否销售并分发给潜在用户或公众？

6. 资产是分散在不同的用户基础上，还是集中在少数可以影响其应用程序的人手中？

7. 应用程序是完全运行还是处于开发的早期阶段？

这些都是令人兴奋的法律时期，我很高兴成为这个过程的一部分，可以帮助这种新技术的推动者及其律师应对并遵守联邦证券法。

Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)

Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto

Thank you Andy. I am pleased to be here today.[1] This event provides a great opportunity to address a topic that is the subject of considerable debate in the press and in the crypto-community – whether a digital asset offered as a security can, over time, become something other than a security.[2]

To start, we should frame the question differently and focus not on the digital asset itself, but on the circumstances surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is sold. To that end, a better line of inquiry is: “Can a digital asset that was originally offered in a securities offering ever be later sold in a manner that does not constitute an offering of a security?” In cases where the digital asset represents a set of rights that gives the holder a financial interest in an enterprise, the answer is likely “no.” In these cases, calling the transaction an initial coin offering, or “ICO,” or a sale of a “token,” will not take it out of the purview of the U.S. securities laws.

But what about cases where there is no longer any central enterprise being invested in or where the digital asset is sold only to be used to purchase a good or service available through the network on which it was created? I believe in these cases the answer is a qualified “yes.” I would like to share my thinking with you today about the circumstances under which that could occur.

Before I turn to the securities law analysis, let me share what I believe may be most exciting about distributed ledger technology – that is, the potential to share information, transfer value, and record transactions in a decentralized digital environment. Potential applications include supply chain management, intellectual property rights licensing, stock ownership transfers and countless others. There is real value in creating applications that can be accessed and executed electronically with a public, immutable record and without the need for a trusted third party to verify transactions. Some people believe that this technology will transform e-commerce as we know it. There is excitement and a great deal of speculative interest around this new technology. Unfortunately, there also are cases of fraud. In many regards, it is still “early days.”

But I am not here to discuss the promise of technology – there are many in attendance and speaking here today that can do a much better job of that. I would like to focus on the application of the federal securities laws to digital asset transactions – that is how tokens and coins are being issued, distributed and sold. While perhaps a bit dryer than the promise of the blockchain, this topic is critical to the broader acceptance and use of these novel instruments.

I will begin by describing what I often see. Promoters,[3] in order to raise money to develop networks on which digital assets will operate, often sell the tokens or coins rather than sell shares, issue notes or obtain bank financing. But, in many cases, the economic substance is the same as a conventional securities offering. Funds are raised with the expectation that the promoters will build their system and investors can earn a return on the instrument – usually by selling their tokens in the secondary market once the promoters create something of value with the proceeds and the value of the digital enterprise increases.

When we see that kind of economic transaction, it is easy to apply the Supreme Court’s “investment contract” test first announced in SEC v. Howey.[4] That test requires an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others. And it is important to reflect on the facts of Howey. A hotel operator sold interests in a citrus grove to its guests and claimed it was selling real estate, not securities. While the transaction was recorded as a real estate sale, it also included a service contract to cultivate and harvest the oranges. The purchasers could have arranged to service the grove themselves but, in fact, most were passive, relying on the efforts of Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. for a return. In articulating the test for an investment contract, the Supreme Court stressed: “Form [is] disregarded for substance and the emphasis [is] placed upon economic reality.”[5] So the purported real estate purchase was found to be an investment contract – an investment in orange groves was in these circumstances an investment in a security.

Just as in the Howey case, tokens and coins are often touted as assets that have a use in their own right, coupled with a promise that the assets will be cultivated in a way that will cause them to grow in value, to be sold later at a profit. And, as in Howey – where interests in the groves were sold to hotel guests, not farmers – tokens and coins typically are sold to a wide audience rather than to persons who are likely to use them on the network.

In the ICOs I have seen, overwhelmingly, promoters tout their ability to create an innovative application of blockchain technology. Like in Howey, the investors are passive. Marketing efforts are rarely narrowly targeted to token users. And typically at the outset, the business model and very viability of the application is still uncertain. The purchaser usually has no choice but to rely on the efforts of the promoter to build the network and make the enterprise a success. At that stage, the purchase of a token looks a lot like a bet on the success of the enterprise and not the purchase of something used to exchange for goods or services on the network.

As an aside, you might ask, given that these token sales often look like securities offerings, why are the promoters choosing to package the investment as a coin or token offering? This is an especially good question if the network on which the token or coin will function is not yet operational. I think there can be a number of reasons. For a while, some believed such labeling might, by itself, remove the transaction from the securities laws. I think people now realize labeling an investment opportunity as a coin or token does not achieve that result. Second, this labeling might have been used to bring some marketing “sizzle” to the enterprise. That might still work to some extent, but the track record of ICOs is still being sorted out and some of that sizzle may now be more of a potential warning flare for investors.

Some may be attracted to a blockchain-mediated crowdfunding process. Digital assets can represent an efficient way to reach a global audience where initial purchasers have a stake in the success of the network and become part of a network where their participation adds value beyond their investment contributions. The digital assets are then exchanged – for some, to help find the market price for the new application; for others, to speculate on the venture. As I will discuss, whether a transaction in a coin or token on the secondary market amounts to an offer or sale of a security requires a careful and fact-sensitive legal analysis.

I believe some industry participants are beginning to realize that, in some circumstances, it might be easier to start a blockchain-based enterprise in a more conventional way. In other words, conduct the initial funding through a registered or exempt equity or debt offering and, once the network is up and running, distribute or offer blockchain-based tokens or coins to participants who need the functionality the network and the digital assets offer. This allows the tokens or coins to be structured and offered in a way where it is evident that purchasers are not making an investment in the development of the enterprise.

Returning to the ICOs I am seeing, strictly speaking, the token – or coin or whatever the digital information packet is called – all by itself is not a security, just as the orange groves in Howey were not. Central to determining whether a security is being sold is how it is being sold and the reasonable expectations of purchasers. When someone buys a housing unit to live in, it is probably not a security.[6] But under certain circumstances, the same asset can be offered and sold in a way that causes investors to have a reasonable expectation of profits based on the efforts of others. For example, if the housing unit is offered with a management contract or other services, it can be a security.[7] Similarly, when a CD, exempt from being treated as a security under Section 3 of the Securities Act, is sold as a part of a program organized by a broker who offers retail investors promises of liquidity and the potential to profit from changes in interest rates, the Gary Plastic case teaches us that the instrument can be part of an investment contract that is a security.[8]

The same reasoning applies to digital assets. The digital asset itself is simply code. But the way it is sold – as part of an investment; to non-users; by promoters to develop the enterprise – can be, and, in that context, most often is, a security – because it evidences an investment contract. And regulating these transactions as securities transactions makes sense. The impetus of the Securities Act is to remove the information asymmetry between promoters and investors. In a public distribution, the Securities Act prescribes the information investors need to make an informed investment decision, and the promoter is liable for material misstatements in the offering materials. These are important safeguards, and they are appropriate for most ICOs. The disclosures required under the federal securities laws nicely complement the Howey investment contract element about the efforts of others. As an investor, the success of the enterprise – and the ability to realize a profit on the investment – turns on the efforts of the third party. So learning material information about the third party – its background, financing, plans, financial stake and so forth – is a prerequisite to making an informed investment decision. Without a regulatory framework that promotes disclosure of what the third party alone knows of these topics and the risks associated with the venture, investors will be uninformed and are at risk.

But this also points the way to when a digital asset transaction may no longer represent a security offering. If the network on which the token or coin is to function is sufficiently decentralized – where purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts – the assets may not represent an investment contract. Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor for determining the enterprise’s success, material information asymmetries recede. As a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful.

And so, when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central third party whose efforts are a key determining factor in the enterprise. The network on which Bitcoin functions is operational and appears to have been decentralized for some time, perhaps from inception. Applying the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to the offer and resale of Bitcoin would seem to add little value.[9] And putting aside the fundraising that accompanied the creation of Ether, based on my understanding of the present state of Ether, the Ethereum network and its decentralized structure, current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions. And, as with Bitcoin, applying the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to current transactions in Ether would seem to add little value. Over time, there may be other sufficiently decentralized networks and systems where regulating the tokens or coins that function on them as securities may not be required. And of course there will continue to be systems that rely on central actors whose efforts are a key to the success of the enterprise. In those cases, application of the securities laws protects the investors who purchase the tokens or coins.

I would like to emphasize that the analysis of whether something is a security is not static and does not strictly inhere to the instrument.[10] Even digital assets with utility that function solely as a means of exchange in a decentralized network could be packaged and sold as an investment strategy that can be a security. If a promoter were to place Bitcoin in a fund or trust and sell interests, it would create a new security. Similarly, investment contracts can be made out of virtually any asset (including virtual assets), provided the investor is reasonably expecting profits from the promoter’s efforts.

Let me emphasize an earlier point: simply labeling a digital asset a “utility token” does not turn the asset into something that is not a security.[11] I recognize that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that if someone is purchasing an asset for consumption only, it is likely not a security.[12] But, the economic substance of the transaction always determines the legal analysis, not the labels.[13] The oranges in Howey had utility. Or in my favorite example, the Commission warned in the late 1960s about investment contracts sold in the form of whisky warehouse receipts.[14] Promoters sold the receipts to U.S. investors to finance the aging and blending processes of Scotch whisky. The whisky was real – and, for some, had exquisite utility. But Howey was not selling oranges and the warehouse receipts promoters were not selling whisky for consumption. They were selling investments, and the purchasers were expecting a return from the promoters’ efforts.

Promoters and other market participants need to understand whether transactions in a particular digital asset involve the sale of a security. We are happy to help promoters and their counsel work through these issues. We stand prepared to provide more formal interpretive or no-action guidance about the proper characterization of a digital asset in a proposed use.[15] In addition, we recognize that there are numerous implications under the federal securities laws of a particular asset being considered a security. For example, our Divisions of Trading and Markets and Investment Management are focused on such issues as broker-dealer, exchange and fund registration, as well as matters of market manipulation, custody and valuation. We understand that market participants are working to make their services compliant with the existing regulatory framework, and we are happy to continue our engagement in this process.

What are some of the factors to consider in assessing whether a digital asset is offered as an investment contract and is thus a security? Primarily, consider whether a third party – be it a person, entity or coordinated group of actors – drives the expectation of a return. That question will always depend on the particular facts and circumstances, and this list is illustrative, not exhaustive:

Is there a person or group that has sponsored or promoted the creation and sale of the digital asset, the efforts of whom play a significant role in the development and maintenance of the asset and its potential increase in value?

Has this person or group retained a stake or other interest in the digital asset such that it would be motivated to expend efforts to cause an increase in value in the digital asset? Would purchasers reasonably believe such efforts will be undertaken and may result in a return on their investment in the digital asset?

Has the promoter raised an amount of funds in excess of what may be needed to establish a functional network, and, if so, has it indicated how those funds may be used to support the value of the tokens or to increase the value of the enterprise? Does the promoter continue to expend funds from proceeds or operations to enhance the functionality and/or value of the system within which the tokens operate?

Are purchasers “investing,” that is seeking a return? In that regard, is the instrument marketed and sold to the general public instead of to potential users of the network for a price that reasonably correlates with the market value of the good or service in the network?

Does application of the Securities Act protections make sense? Is there a person or entity others are relying on that plays a key role in the profit-making of the enterprise such that disclosure of their activities and plans would be important to investors? Do informational asymmetries exist between the promoters and potential purchasers/investors in the digital asset?

Do persons or entities other than the promoter exercise governance rights or meaningful influence?

While these factors are important in analyzing the role of any third party, there are contractual or technical ways to structure digital assets so they function more like a consumer item and less like a security. Again, we would look to the economic substance of the transaction, but promoters and their counsels should consider these, and other, possible features. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and by no means do I believe each and every one of these factors needs to be present to establish a case that a token is not being offered as a security. This list is meant to prompt thinking by promoters and their counsel, and start the dialogue with the staff – it is not meant to be a list of all necessary factors in a legal analysis.

Is token creation commensurate with meeting the needs of users or, rather, with feeding speculation?

Are independent actors setting the price or is the promoter supporting the secondary market for the asset or otherwise influencing trading?

Is it clear that the primary motivation for purchasing the digital asset is for personal use or consumption, as compared to investment? Have purchasers made representations as to their consumptive, as opposed to their investment, intent? Are the tokens available in increments that correlate with a consumptive versus investment intent?

Are the tokens distributed in ways to meet users’ needs? For example, can the tokens be held or transferred only in amounts that correspond to a purchaser’s expected use? Are there built-in incentives that compel using the tokens promptly on the network, such as having the tokens degrade in value over time, or can the tokens be held for extended periods for investment?

Is the asset marketed and distributed to potential users or the general public?

Are the assets dispersed across a diverse user base or concentrated in the hands of a few that can exert influence over the application?

Is the application fully functioning or in early stages of development?

These are exciting legal times and I am pleased to be part of a process that can help promoters of this new technology and their counsel navigate and comply with the federal securities laws.

[1] The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any SEC employee or Commissioner. This speech expresses the author’s views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners or other members of the staff.

[2] Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)] and Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)] define “security.” These definitions contain “slightly different formulations” of the term “security,” but the U.S. Supreme Court has “treated [them] as essentially identical in meaning.” SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).

[3] I am using the term “promoters” in a broad, generic sense. The important factor in the legal analysis is that there is a person or coordinated group (including “any unincorporated organization” see 5 U.S.C. § 77n(a)(4)) that is working actively to develop or guide the development of the infrastructure of the network. This person or group could be founders, sponsors, developers or “promoters” in the traditional sense. The presence of promoters in this context is important to distinguish from the circumstance where multiple, independent actors work on the network but no individual actor’s or coordinated group of actors’ efforts are essential efforts that affect the failure or success of the enterprise.

[4] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Depending on the features of any given instrument and the surrounding facts, it may also need to be evaluated as a possible security under the general definition of security – see footnote 2 – and the case law interpreting it.

[5] Id. at 298.

[6] United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).

[7] Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, SEC Rel. No. 33-5347 (Jan. 4, 1973).

[8] Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).

[9] Secondary trading in digital assets by regulated entities may otherwise implicate the federal securities laws, as well as the Commodity Exchange Act. In addition, as SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has stated, regulated financial entities that allow for payment in cryptocurrencies, allow customers to purchase cryptocurrencies on margin or otherwise use cryptocurrencies to facilitate securities transactions should exercise caution, including ensuring that their cryptocurrency activities are not undermining their anti-money laundering and know-your-customer obligations. Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017). In addition, other laws and regulations, such as IRS regulations and state money servicing laws, may be implicated.

[10] The Supreme Court’s investment contract test “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.

[11] “[T]he name given to an instrument is not dispositive.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 850.

[12] Forman, 421 U.S. at 853.

[13] See footnotes 10 and 11.

[14] SEC Rel. No. 33-5018 (Nov. 4, 1969); Investment in Interests in Whisky, SEC Rel. No. 33-5451 (Jan 7, 1974).

[15] For example, some have raised questions about the offering structure commonly referred to as a Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, or “SAFT.” Because the legal analysis must follow the economic realities of the particular facts of an offering, it may not be fruitful to debate a hypothetical structure in the abstract and nothing in these remarks is meant to opine on the legality or appropriateness of a SAFT. From the discussion in this speech, however, it is clear I believe a token once offered in a security offering can, depending on the circumstances, later be offered in a non-securities transaction. I expect that some, perhaps many, may not. I encourage anyone that has questions on a particular SAFT structure to consult with knowledgeable securities counsel or the staff.